In this paper, we discuss the consequences of imperfect information about financial frictions on the macroeconomy. We rely on a New Keynesian DSGE model with a banking sector in which we introduce imperfect information about a limited enforcement problem. Bank managers divert resources and can...

What happens when fiscal and/or monetary policy changes systematically? We construct a DSGE model in which agents have to estimate fiscal and monetary policy rules and assess how uncertainty surrounding the conduct of policymakers influences transition paths after policy changes. We find that...

What happens when fiscal and/or monetary policy changes systematically? We construct a DSGE model in which agents have to estimate fiscal and monetary policy rules and assess how uncertainty surrounding the conduct of policymakers influences transition paths after policy changes. We find that...

What happens when fiscal and/or monetary policy changes systematically? We construct a DSGE model in which agents have to estimate fiscal and monetary policy rules and assess how uncertainty surrounding the conduct of policymakers influences transition paths after policy changes. We find that...