This paper shows that long debt maturities eliminate equityholders' incentives to reduce leverage when the firm performs poorly. By contrast, short debt maturities commit equityholders to such leverage reductions. However, shorter debt maturities also lead to higher transactions costs when...

We analyze the relation between comprehensive measures of board quality and the cost as well as the non-price terms of bank loans. We show that firms with higher quality boards and even a single (non-insider) advisory board member borrow at lower interest rates. This relation exists even after...

Numerous studies have focused on the theoretical and empirical aspects of corporate capital structure since the 1960s. As a new branch of capital structure, however, debt maturity structure has not yet received as much attention as the debt-equity choice. We use the existing theories of...

This study provides new insights on the relationship between corporate debt maturity and agency costs by investigating empirically the impact of managerial ownership and the divergence between control and cash-flow rights on debt maturity. A significant negative effect of managerial ownership on...

Admati, Demarzo, Hellwig, and Pfleiderer (ADHP, 2018) note that static models of optimal leverage have assumed firms have no prior debt. In this case, the leverage that maximizes firm value also maximizes value to the initial equity owners. However, using a simple two-period model with zero...

The “low risk anomaly” refers to the empirical pattern that apparently high-risk equities do not earn commensurately high returns. In this paper, we consider the possibility that the risk anomaly represents mispricing, not a misspecification of risk, and develop the implications for...

This paper provides empirical evidence of a clientele effect between institutional holdings and debt maturity structure. Using a new measure of debt maturity that captures the refinancing and underinvestment risks associated with the timing of cash flows, I find that institutional equity holders...

Debt may help to manage type II corporate agency conflicts because it is easier for controlling shareholders to modify the leverage ratio than to modify their share of capital. A sample of 112 firms listed on the French stock market over the period 1998-2009 is empirically tested. It supports an...

We study how the relative availability of bond and bank financing supply affects the firm's ability to borrow and to use its leverage to buffer shocks. We define a measure that proxies for the regional borrowing inflexibility in the availability of bank and bond financing: “debt...

Leasing's impact on leverage remains an open debate in the literature. Some argue that leasing and secured debt are substitutes, while others argue that leasing can preserve secured debt capacity and facilitate greater borrowing. I exploit a Moody's accounting policy change that unexpectedly...