Ch 1: Introduction -- Ch 2. Risk Management in a Single Country -- Ch 3. One-dimensional Public Goods in an Alliance -- Ch 4. Protection and Insurance in an Alliance -- Ch 5. Exploitation Hypothesis and Numerical Calculations -- Ch 6. Misperceptions and NGOs -- Ch 7. Financial Crises -- Ch 8....

In three sets of experiments involving 5,432 subjects, we show that agents make more errors when doing so allows them to justify selfish behavior. We show that errors relating to addition arise when they can help to justify selfishness but are eliminated when selfish motives are removed. In...

The exogenous manipulation of choice architectures to achieve social ends ('social nudges') can raise problems of effectiveness and ethicality because it favors group outcomes over individual outcomes. One answer is to give individuals control over their nudge ('self-nudge'), but the trade-offs...