We analyze a dynamic moral hazard problem in teams with imperfect monitoring in continuous time. In the model, players are working together to achieve a breakthrough in a project while facing a deadline. The effort needed to achieve a breakthrough is unknown but players have a common prior about...

We consider dynamic team production in the presence of uncertainty. Team members receive interim feedback that depends on both their current effort level and the project's uncertain prospects. In this environment, each member can encourage the others by making them more optimistic about the...

We give a set of sufficient conditions for uniqueness of a time-consistent Markov stationary consumption policy for a quasi-hyperbolic household under uncertainty. To the best of our knowledge, this uniqueness result is the first presented in the literature for general settings, i.e. under...

We analyze a two-stage game of strategic firms facing uncertain demand and exerting market power in decentralized electricity markets. These firms choose their generation capacities at the first stage while anticipating a perfectly competitive future electricity spot market outcome at the second...

We study the problem a diagnostic expert (e.g., a physician) faces when offering a diagnosis to a client (e.g., a patient) that may be based only on her own diagnostic ability or supplemented by a diagnostic test — conventional and artificial intelligence (AI) tools alike — revealing the...

We provide an evolutionary foundation to evidence that in some situations humans maintain optimistic or pessimistic attitudes towards uncertainty and are ignorant to relevant aspects of the environment. Players in strategic games face Knightian uncertainty about opponents' actions and maximize...

This paper studies the behavior of two firms after a new investment opportunity arises. Examples of such an investment are technology adoption or market entry. Firms either invest immediately or wait until market uncertainty is resolved. Two types of separating equilibrium are possible when...

This paper studies a class of robust mean-variance portfolio selection problems with state-dependent risk aversion. Model uncertainty, in the sense of considering alternative dominated models, is introduced to the problem to reflect the investor's ambiguity aversion. To characterize the robust...

We provide an evolutionary foundation to evidence that in some situations humans maintain either optimistic or pessimistic attitudes towards uncertainty and are ignorant to relevant aspects of the environment. Players in strategic games face Knightian uncertainty about opponents' actions and...

In this paper, we present a model of finitely repeated games in which players can strategically make use of objective ambiguity. In each round of a finite rep- etition of a finite stage-game, in addition to the classic pure and mixed actions, players can employ objectively ambiguous actions by...