I study the problem of regulating a network of interdependent financial institutions that is prone to contagion when …-improving interventions. While improving network transparency potentially reduces this uncertainty, it does not always lead to welfare … improvements. Under certain conditions, regulation that reduces the risk-taking incentives of a small set of institutions can …

I study the problem of regulating a network of interdependent financial institutions that is prone to contagion when …-improving interventions. While improving network transparency potentially reduces this uncertainty, it does not always lead to welfare … improvements. Under certain conditions, regulation that reduces the risk-taking incentives of a small set of institutions can …

We consider an incomplete information network game in which agents’ information is restricted only to the identity of … walks they have in the network. Our model clearly demonstrates how asymmetric information based on network position and the … identity of agents affect strategic behavior in such network games. We also characterize agent behavior in equilibria under …