In this paper we study the effects that loss contracts - prepayments that can be clawbacked later - have on group coordination when there is strategic uncertainty. We compare the choices made by experimental subjects in a minimum effort game. In control sessions, incentives are formulated as a...

We propose a model of instrumental belief choice under loss aversion. When new information arrives, an agent is prompted to abandon her prior. However, potential posteriors may induce her to take actions that generate a lower utility in some states than actions induced by her prior. These losses...

Companies are increasingly adopting Artificial Intelligence (AI) today. Recently however debates started over the risk of human cognitive biases being replicated (and scaled) by AI. Research on biases in AI predicting consumer choice is incipient and focuses on observable biases. We provide a...

We study the problem of elicitation of subjective beliefs of an agent when the beliefs are ambiguous (the set of beliefs is a non-singleton set) and the agent's preference exhibits ambiguity aversion; in particular, as represented by alpha-maxmin preferences. We construct a direct revelation...

Using an approach based on evolution and adaptation, we provide foundations for a model of choice under uncertainty based on adaptive preferences, and we show that updating of those preferences in response to new information will respect dynamic consistency even at the cost of violating...