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Vesperoni, Alberto; Wärneryd, Karl - 2016

nations, as in a strategic game of international conflict handing over military spending decisions to citizens who face a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011452800

Democracy for polarized committees : the tale of Blotto's lieutenants

Casella, Alessandra; Laslier, Jean-François; Macé, Antonin - In: Games and economic behavior 106 (2017), pp. 239-259

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011793699

Freedom and Democracy in a World Governed by Finance : Habermas and the Crisis in Europe -- A Free Labor Response

Minda, Gary - 2017

Jürgen Habermas has recently warned that the sovereign debt crisis in Europe is transforming democratic governments into ‘economic government' threatening not only economic disaster but the end of the world's first supranational project — the European Union. And, according to Habermas,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012974763

Investing in influence : how minority interests can prevail in a democracy

Skaperdas, Stergios; Vaidya, Samarth - 2021

How can the West's economic and political polarization be explained? We argue that persuasive lobbying at various …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012649786

Volatility and resilience of democratic public-good provision

Gersbach, Hans; Pitsuwan, Fikri; Bolgè, Giovanni Valvassori - 2024

We examine democratic public-good provision with heterogeneous legislators. Decisions are taken by majority rule and an agenda-setter proposes a level of the public good, taxes, and subsidies. Members are heterogeneous with respect to their benefits from the public good. We find that, depending...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014500614

Democratizing from within : British elites and the expansion of the franchise

Basu, Chitralekha; Boix, Carles; Giurumescu, Sonia; … - 2022

We develop a theory of democratization that integrates both electoral calculations and economic incentives to explain the institutional choices of political actors. Left-leaning (liberal) politicians, who, given their location in the policy space, are more likely to receive the support of newly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012818399

Capital Cities, Conflict, and Misgovernance: Theory and Evidence

Campante, Filipe R.; Do, Quoc-Anh; Guimaraes, Bernardo - Sciences économiques, Sciences Po - 2014

We investigate the links between capital cities, conict, and the quality of governance, starting from the assumption that incumbent elites are constrained by the threat of insurrection, and that this threat is rendered less e_ective by distance from the seat of political power. We develop a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010934658

Capital Cities, Conflict, and Misgovernance: Theory and Evidence

Campante, Filipe R.; Do, Quoc-Anh; Guimaraes, Bernardo - Department of Economics, Sciences économiques - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010934664

Democracy, Collective Action and Intra-elite Conflict

Ghosal, Sayantan; Proto, Eugenio - Department of Economics, University of Warwick - 2008

This paper studies the conditions under which intra-elite conflict leads to a democracy. There are two risk averse …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005368658

Chapter 31 Trade, Peace and Democracy: An Analysis of Dyadic Dispute

Polachek, Solomon W.; Seiglie, Carlos - In: Handbook of defense economics : volume 2, Defense in a …, (pp. 1017-1073). 2007

comparative advantage leads to gains from trade. If political conflict leads to a diminution of trade, then at least a portion of … the costs of conflict can be measured by a nation's lost gains from trade. The greater two nations' gains from trade the … more costly is bilateral (dyadic) conflict. This notion forms the basis of Baron de Montesquieu's assertion regarding …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024398

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