This paper places the institution of bank deposit protection in the context of government paternalism. I apply the theories of deposit insurance, merit goods, patronized goods, government paternalism, and institutional change to the analysis of the Russian case. I rely on statistical data from...

The case of deposit insurance introduction in Russia may suggest that institutional change in post-socialist economies was partly driven by subjective factors, and the choice of imported institutions was rather random. The circumstances under which explicit deposit insurance emerged in Russia...

Drawing on the merit goods concept developed by Richard A. Musgrave, this paper introduces the notion of quasi-merit goods. The criteria of eligibility for merit goods are vague. A quasi-merit good constitutes a special case where government protection and sponsorship are obtained via public...

The paper examines the Russian experience with explicit deposit guarantee. Some of the effects that this institution has produced in Russia are typical and well-researched by previous authors, namely moral hazard, adverse selection, and erosion of discipline. The social cost paid for having an...