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This paper studies the role of a lender of last resort (LLR) in a monetary model where a shortage of bank's monetary reserves (or a banking panic) occurs endogenously. We show that while a discount window policy introduced by the LLR is welfare improving, it reduces the banks' ex ante incentive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011956327
This paper studies the role of a lender of last resort (LLR) in a monetary model where a shortage of bank’s monetary reserves (or a banking panic) occurs endogenously. We show that while a discount window policy introduced by the LLR is welfare improving, it reduces the banks’ ex ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011954204
This paper argues that an optimal deposit insurance scheme would allow the level of insurance coverage to be determined by the market. Based on this principle, the paper proposes an insurance scheme that minimizes distortions and embodies fairness and credibility, two essential characteristics...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005768851
On 16th November 2009, SUERF, CEPS and the Belgian Financial Forum coorganized a conference "Crisis management at cross-roads" in Brussels. All papers in the present volume are based on contributions at the conference and the SUERF Annual Lecture which followed the event.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011706117
We study the interaction between a government's bailout policy and banks' willingness to impose losses on (or \bail in") their investors. The government has limited commitment and may choose to bail out banks facing large losses. The anticipation of this bailout undermines a bank's private...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012418049
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002951019
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002754735
In this paper, we study the optimal design of financial safety nets under limited private credit. We ask when it is optimal to restrict ex ante the set of investors that can receive public liquidity support ex post. When the government can commit, the optimal safety net covers all investors....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012983670
In this paper, we study the optimal design of financial safety nets under limited private credit. We ask when it is optimal to restrict ex ante the set of investors that can receive public liquidity support ex post. When the government can commit, the optimal safety net covers all investors....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012456085