In this article we derive risk-neutral option price formulas for both plain-vanilla and exotic electricity futures derivatives on the basis of diverse arithmetic multi-factor Ornstein-Uhlenbeck spot price models admitting seasonality, while – in order to avoid “information...

We derive risk-neutral option price formulas for plain-vanilla and exotic electricity futures derivatives on the basis of diverse arithmetic multi-factor Ornstein-Uhlenbeck spot price models admitting seasonality. In these setups, we take additional forward-looking knowledge on future price...

Regulations impose idiosyncratic capital and funding costs for holding derivatives. Capital requirements are costly because derivatives desks are risky businesses; funding is costly in part because regulations increase the minimum funding tenor. Idiosyncratic costs mean no single measure makes...

We apply Geometric Arbitrage Theory to obtain results in mathematical finance for credit markets, which do not need stochastic differential geometry in their formulation. We obtain closed form equations involving default intensities and loss given defaults characterizing the...

We demonstrate how suppliers can take strategic speculative positions in derivatives markets to soften competition in the spot market. In our game, suppliers first choose a portfolio of call options and then compete with supply functions. In equilibrium firms sell forward contracts and buy call...

We demonstrate how suppliers can take strategic speculative positions in derivatives markets to soften competition in the spot market. In our game, suppliers first choose a portfolio of call options and then compete with supply functions. In equilibrium firms sell forward contracts and buy call...

This paper studies the effect of forward contracts on the stability of collusion among firms, competing in supply functions on the spot market. A forward market can increase the range of discount factors which allow to sustain collusion. On the contrary, collusion is destabilised when a...

This paper studies the effect of forward contracts on the stability of collusion among firms, competing in supply functions on the spot market. A forward market can increase the range of discount factors which allow to sustain collusion. On the contrary, collusion is destabilised when a...

We demonstrate how suppliers can take strategic speculative positions in derivatives markets to soften competition in the spot market. In our game, suppliers first choose a portfolio of call options and then compete with supply functions. In equilibrium firms sell forward contracts and buy call...

We demonstrate how suppliers can take strategic speculative positions in derivatives markets to soften competition in the spot market. In our game, suppliers first choose a portfolio of call options and then compete with supply functions. In equilibrium firms sell forward contracts and buy call...