An important element for the public support of policies is their perceived justice. At the same time most policy choices have uncertain outcomes. We report the results of a first experiment investigating just allocations of resources when some recipients are exposed to uncertainty. Although,...

We elicit reciprocal preferences in a firm-worker gift-exchange setting and relate them to actual behavior in a repeated gift-exchange game. We find that only a small minority of 10 percent of workers is materially selfish whereas 90 percent exhibit reciprocal preferences. However, the intensity...

We consider a cheap-talk setting that mimics the situation where an incumbent firm the sender is endowed with incentives to understate the true size of the market demand to two potential entrants the receivers. Although our experimental data reveals that senders messages convey truthful...

Does adverse selection hamper the effectiveness of voluntary risk sharing? How do differences in risk profiles affect adverse selection? We experimentally investigate individuals' willingness to share risks with others. Across treatments we vary how risk profiles differ between individuals. We...

To accurately predict behavior economists need reliable measures of individual time preferences and attitudes toward risk and typically need to assume stability of these characteristics over time and across decision domains. We test the reliability of two choice tasks for eliciting discount...

We experimentally investigate a bargaining environment in which players negotiate over a xed payment to one player, while the other player receives the residual from a random pie realization after subtracting the xed payment. Contrary to the intuition that risk exposure is detrimental, we show...

This paper presents the results from an experiment investigating whether framing affects the elicitation and predictive power of preferences for cooperation, i.e., the willingness to cooperate with others. Cooperation preferences are elicited in three treatments using the method of Fischbacher,...

In this paper we present a mechanism to elicit and aggregate dispersed information. Our mechanism relies on the aggregation of intervals elicited using an interval scoring rule. We test our mechanism by eliciting beliefs about the termination times of a stochastic process in an experimental...