It is often argued that a mandatory minimum wage is binding only if the wage density displays a spike at it. In this paper we analyze a model with wage setting, search frictions, and heterogeneous production technologies, in which imposition of a minimum wage affects wages even though, after...

It is often argued that a mandatory minimum wage is binding only if the wage density displays a spike at it. In this paper we analyze a model with wage setting, search frictions, and heterogeneous production technologies, in which imposition of a minimum wage affects wages even though, after...

Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex-ante...

Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante...

Public Employment Service (PES) agencies and caseworkers (CW) often have substantial leeway in the design and implementation of active labor market policies (ALMP) for the unemployed, resulting in variation of usage. This paper presents a novel framework in which this variation is used for the...

Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante...