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Allocation mechanisms : group bargaining and multi-unit auctions
Demidova, Ekaterina - 2013
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010237123
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Vertragstheorie : Eine Einführung mit finanzökonomischen Beispielen und Anwendungen ; mit 9 Tabellen
Bannier, Christina E. - 2005
Entscheidungen. Die Analyse der typischen vertragstheoretischen Probleme des Moral Hazard, der Adverse Selection und des Signalling … sowie aktueller Forschungsfragen zur Theorie der Firma und der Auktionsökonomie erfolgt dabei durch Anwendung … möchten. TOC:Überblick über die Vertragstheorie.- Spieltheorie.- Moral Hazard.- Signalling und Screening.- Adverse Selection …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013515126
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Vertragstheorie : eine Einführung mit finanzökonomischen Beispielen und Anwendungen; mit ... 9 Tabellen
Bannier, Christina E. - 2005
Entscheidungen. Die Analyse der typischen vertragstheoretischen Probleme des Moral Hazard, der Adverse Selection und des Signalling … sowie aktueller Forschungsfragen zur Theorie der Firma und der Auktionsökonomie erfolgt dabei durch Anwendung … möchten. TOC:Überblick über die Vertragstheorie.- Spieltheorie.- Moral Hazard.- Signalling und Screening.- Adverse Selection …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014010405
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The role of sickness in the evaluation of job search assistance and sanctions
Berg, Gerard J. van den; Hofmann, Barbara; Uhlendorff, Arne - 2016
Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011418245
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The role of sickness in the evaluation of job search assistance and sanctions
Berg, Gerard J. van den; Hofmann, Barbara; Uhlendorff, Arne - 2016
Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011449662
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A structural analysis of vacancy referrals with imperfect monitoring and the strategic use of sickness absence
Berg, Gerard J. van den; Foerster, Hanno; Uhlendorff, Arne - 2021
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012805196
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The role of sickness in the evaluation of job search assistance and sanctions
Berg, Gerard J. van den; Hofmann, Barbara; Uhlendorff, Arne - 2016
Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex-ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011414725
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The role of sickness in the evaluation of job search assistance and sanctions
Berg, Gerard J. van den; Hofmann, Barbara; Uhlendorff, Arne - 2016
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011855287
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The role of sickness in the evaluation of job search assistance and sanctions
Berg, Gerard J. van den; Hofmann, Barbara; Uhlendorff, Arne - 2017
Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011635521
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Die Sozialisierung individueller Risiken : eine Public-Choice-Analyse staatlicher Sozialversicherungssysteme
Amann, Bernd - 1993
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000855018