We use consumer panel data to calculate the damage suffered by German consumers due to a detergent cartel that was … the period from July 2004 until March 2005. Under the assumptions that the cartel-induced share on turnover is … representative for the entire cartel period and all affected markets, the overall consumer damage would even sum up to about 315 …

We use consumer panel data to calculate the damage suffered by German consumers due to a detergent cartel that was … the period from July 2004 until March 2005. Under the assumptions that the cartel-induced share on turnover is … representative for the entire cartel period and all affected markets, the overall consumer damage would even sum up to about 315 …

competition law and policy. Beyond this question, it is unclear whether law and the Cartel Office can detect margin squeeze …

Bundeskartellamt (German Federal Cartel Office) in the Edeka/ Kaiser’s Tengelmann case (file no. B2-96/14) as an example. The focus is … in the respective international context. To the authors’ best knowledge both these aspects constitute novel developments …

A challenge for many cartels is avoiding a destabilizing increase in non-cartel supply in response to having raised … price. In the case of the German cement cartel that operated over 1991-2002, the primary source of non-cartel supply was … imports from Eastern European cement manufacturers. Industry sources have claimed that the cartel sought to control imports by …

We hypothesize a particular source of cartel instability and explore its relevance to understanding cartel dynamics …. The cartel instability is rooted in the observation that, upon cartel formation, the relative positions of firms are often … fixed which may lead some growthconscious members to be discontent. This incongruity between a cartel member’s allocated …

breakdown of a German cement cartel. We find that, first, after the breakdown of the cartel, cartel members reduce net prices to … a far larger extent than gross prices and that, second, noncartel members slip under the price umbrella of the cartel to …

Cartel detection is usually viewed as a key task of either competition authorities or compliance officials in firms … price screen would have allowed particularly larger customers to detect the upstream cement cartel before the competition …

We use publicly available price data from the German cement industry to estimate the cartel-induced price increase. We …-in-differences' approach – and especially study the impact of various assumptions on the transition period from the cartel period to the non-cartel … period on the overcharge estimate. We find that the cement cartel led to price overcharges in a range from 20.3 to 26 …