Despite the advances in New Institutional Economics about the economic consequences of institutions and legal rules, up to now we have only limited knowledge about the mechanisms of the evolution of law. By combining the main ideas of Evolutionary Economics and New Institutional Economics this...

Economic and historic literature is divided on the impact of the war reparations France had to pay to Germany after 1871. In view of the crisis that hit the German economy and stock markets just a few years later some claim that the reparations were a "poisoned" gift that Germany should not have...

Do legal institutions affect norms of cooperation? Using the introduction of the Code Napoleon during the Napoleonic Wars in Germany as a historical experiment, I show that a positive shock to the quality of legal institutions can increase social-capital long-lastingly. I find that individuals...

By most standards, Britain in the 19th century was the leading financial nation in the world, possessing more developed capital markets than any other country. An influential view in the law and finance literature argues that holding macroeconomic factors constant, this difference in financial...

In this paper, we give an overview of the differences in German patent legislations between 1815 and 1876. German patent laws differed in particular with regard to the application and approval system, the treatment of foreign applicants, and patent fees. Differences in the former two categories...

In 1878 the liberal parties lost enough votes to loose the majority in the parliament which they had defended in the general election just one year before. In this paper, the question of where the voters came from and why the voting changed so crucially within one year are re-examined. The...

Magna Carta, a pivotal moment in the emergence of constitutional government, institutionalised constraints on royal power. We depict it as an optimal agreement between two coalitions capable of violence: the king's loyal coalition of barons and the rebel barons. This type of agreement is more...

Do legal institutions affect norms of cooperation? Using the introduction of the Code Napoleon during the Napoleonic Wars in Germany as a historical experiment, I show that a positive shock to the quality of legal institutions can increase social-capital long-lastingly. I find that individuals...

Our purpose here is to challenge the "big-bang" approach to economic history in which some alleged institutional imposition - a deus machine - is claimed to launch a series of new economic behaviors. This so-called prime mover is then carried forward by the inexorable forces of path dependency...

Despite the advances in New Institutional Economics about the economic consequences of institutions and legal rules, up to now we have only limited knowledge about the mechanisms of the evolution of law. By combining the main ideas of Evolutionary Economics and New Institutional Economics this...