Vote-buying is widely used by parties in developing countries to influence the outcome of elections. We examine the impact of vote-buying on growth. We consider a model with a poverty trap where redistribution can promote growth. We show that vote-buying contributes to the persistence of poverty...

Although the theoretical literature often uses lobbying and corruption synonymously, the empirical literature associates lobbying with the preferred mean for exerting influence in developed countries and corruption with the preferred one in developing countries. This paper challenges these...

We consider an argument that it might be helpful to combat poverty in developing countries indirectly by enlisting firms‘ help (as corporate citizens) in reducing corruption. It turns out that this argument crucially depends on a fair number of presmises, including (a) a common interest of...

This paper empirically examines the impact of corruption on FDI in European Union countries, including candidate countries. Our aim is to verify whether Efficient Grease Hypothesis does hold in the case of the EU. Contrary to the Hypothesis, we find that corruption has a negative impact on FDI....

"This paper discusses mechanisms of grand corruption in private sector utility provision in developing countries. By the term "grand corruption," the authors abstract from the petty corruption that consumers experience - for example, when firms and individuals pay bribes to get water delivery or...