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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011559353
Emerging countries exhibit volatile fiscal policies and frequent sovereign debt crises, that significantly diminish the well-being of their citizens. International advisors typically suggest developed-world solutions as a remedy. We argue that the root of the problem lies in the institutional...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014447264
I examine the role of political instability as a potential explanation for the lack of capital flows from rich countries to poor countries (i.e. the `Lucas Paradox'). Using panel data from 1984 to 2014, I document the following: (i) developed countries exhibit larger inflows of foreign direct...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012455975
I examine the role of political instability as a potential explanation for the lack of capital flows from rich countries to poor countries (i.e. the `Lucas Paradox'). Using panel data from 1984 to 2014, I document the following: (i) developed countries exhibit larger inflows of foreign direct...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012982015
This paper documents that countries with low political turnover exhibit larger inflows of foreign direct investment. This correlation is rationalized with a model of redistribution, where policymakers have access to an expropriation technology that can be used to extract resources from foreign...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014129803
Standard real business cycle theory predicts that consumption should be smoother than output, as observed in developed countries. In emerging economies, however, consumption is more volatile than income. In this paper the authors provide a novel explanation of this phenomenon, the ‘consumption...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009141715
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005428644
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009627449
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010480238
We develop a theoretical framework in which political and economic cycles are jointly determined. These cycles are driven by three political economy frictions: policymakers are non-benevolent, they cannot commit to policies, and they have private information about the tightness of the government...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013100994