Fiscal transparency has been consistently identified as a key feature of efficient fiscal policy and a prerequisite for good public governance. However, measuring fiscal transparency remains an empirical challenge, and extant literature on developing countries is still sparse. To that end, this...

We present a simple model, illustrating how democracy may improve the quality of the economic institutions. The model further suggests that institutional quality varies more across autocracies than across democracy and that the positive effect of democracies on economic institutional quality...

In transition and developing countries, we observe rather high levels of corruption even if they have democratic political systems. This is surprising from a political economy perspective, as the majority of people generally suffers from high corruption levels. Our model is based on the fact...

In many developing countries, we observe rather high levels of corruption. This is surprising from a political economy perspective, as the majority of people generally suffers from high corruption levels. We explain why citizens do not exert enough political pressure to reduce corruption if...

In this paper we construct a model in which entrepreneurial innovations are sold into oligopolistic industries and where adverse selection problems between entrepreneurs, venture capitalists and incumbents are present. We show that as exacerbated development by better-informed venture-backed rms...

Corruption is one of the world's most widespread political problems. It can be found on international, national and sub-national level. Access to education and other socio-economic services is of utmost importance for all humans. It is still not exclusively based on merit, but often rather...

Corruption is one of the world's most widespread political problems. It can be found on international, national and sub-national level. Access to education and other socio-economic services is of utmost importance for all humans. It is still not exclusively based on merit, but often rather...