We review the economics of superstars, originally developed for stars in traditional media, and discuss whether they are applicable for the (allegedly) novel phenomenon of stars in social media (influencer, micro-celebrities). Moreover, we analyse potentially new factors for creating social...

We review the economics of superstars, originally developed for stars in traditional media, and discuss whether they are applicable for the (allegedly) novel phenomenon of stars in social media (influencer, micro-celebrities). Moreover, we analyse potentially new factors for creating social...

We consider a software vendor first selling a monopoly platform and then an application running on this platform. He may face competition by an entrant in the applications market. The platform monopolist can benefit from competition for three reasons. First, his profits from the platform...

We examine two episodes of strategic interaction in the U.K. betting industry: (i) Betfair (an entrant multi-sided platform, or MSP) vs. Flutter (also an MSP), and (ii) Betfair vs. traditional bookmakers. We find that although Betfair was an underfunded second mover in the betting exchange...

Platform interoperability is considered a powerful tool to promote competition in digital markets when network effects are at play. We study the effect of interoperability on competition between two ad-financed platforms, allowing for endogenous multi-homing of consumers. When the platforms are...

This online appendix to "Insulated Platform Competition" includes proofs and details of our applications.The paper to which these Appendices apply is available at the following URL: "http://ssrn.com/abstract=1694317" http://ssrn.com/abstract=1694317

Does competition promote efficient platform pricing and market structures? We model imperfect platform competition using a new approach, Insulated Equilibrium (IE). Building on the observation that platforms often charge low prices to build a "critical mass", IE assumes platforms use...

We analyze platform competition where user data is collected to improve ad-targeting. Considering that users incur privacy costs, we show that the equilibrium level of data provision is distorted and can be inefficiently high or low: if overall competition is weak or if targeting benefits are...

Digital platforms frequently refer their users to competitors. We show that these references induce a business-sharing effect that may relax competition for users, resulting in lower quality of content. More surprisingly, user surplus may also decrease as the quality effect may overwhelm the...

We consider a heretofore unexplored explanation for why platforms, such as Internet service providers, might impose download limits on content consumers: doing so increases the degree to which those consumers view content providers products as substitutes. This, in turn, intensifies competition...