Using data on 4.1 million apps at the Google Play Store from 2016 to 2019, we document that GDPR induced the exit of about a third of available apps; and in the quarters following implementation, entry of new apps fell by half. We estimate a structural model of demand and entry in the app...

We consider a software vendor first selling a monopoly platform and then an application running on this platform. He may face competition by an entrant in the applications market. The platform monopolist can benefit from competition for three reasons. First, his profits from the platform...

Das Internet ist stark durch Wettbewerb zwischen Plattformen geprägt, welche potenzielle Tauschpartner zusammenbringen. Die Konkurrenz zwischen solchen mehrseitigen Plattformen und die Marktkonzentration wird maßgeblich bestimmt durch (1) die Stärke der indirekten Netzeffekte, (2) das Ausmaß...

Access to a platform's services often requires consumers to use a complementary hardware product or service, e.g., Internet service is needed to access the YouTube platform. Typically, such access products are provided by third-party firms. More recently, however, some major platforms like...

There is vigorous debate over the ability of the current antitrust enforcement regime in the United States to protect against potential reductions in competition caused by large technology companies. Some commentators have argued that current antitrust rules and processes cannot address...