A platform matches agents from two sides of a market to create a trading opportunity between them. The agents subscribe to the platform by paying subscription fees which are contingent on their reported private types, and then engage in strategic interactions with their matched partner(s). A...

We model platform markets with the matching-with-contracts framework. The solution concept in matching with contracts, stability, has a natural interpretation in platform markets. We use this framework to explore properties in these markets including seesaw principle and market tipping. Finally,...

We consider the pricing problem of a platform that matches heterogeneous agents using match‐contingent fees. Absent prices, agents on the short side of such markets capture relatively greater surplus than those on the long side (Ashlagi et al. 2017). Nevertheless we show that the platform need...

Based on the frictional matching framework, the article provides a theoretical model for a specific type of two-sided platform: the buyerseller transaction platform. In the model, the number of participants and the source of network externalities are endogeneously determined. The platform is...