This paper studies the interactions of fiscal policy and monetary policy when they stabilize a single economy against shocks in a dynamic setting. If both policy-makers are benevolent, then, in our model, the best outcome is achieved when monetary policy does nearly all of the stabilization. If...

Using a small-scale microfounded DSGE model with Markov switching in shock variances and policy parameters, we show that the data-preferred description of US monetary policy is a time consistent targeting rule with a marked increase in conservatism after the 1970s. However, the Fed lost its...

This paper revisits the argument that the stabilisation bias that arises under discretionary monetary policy can be reduced if policy is delegated to a policymaker with redesigned objectives. We study four delegation schemes: price level targeting, interest rate smoothing, speed limits and...

We consider monetary and fiscal policy interactions in a New-Keynesian model of a closed economy with a government solvency constraint. We study the problem of optimal delegation in the discretionary game with two optimising policymakers and provide a welfare ranking of different leadership...

The last few years papers have begun to analyse optimal monetary and fiscal policy in models incorporating nominal rigidities where social welfare is derived from the utility of agents. This paper examines whether this analysis provides support for the consensus assignment, where monetary policy...