While interest in social determinants of individual behavior has led to a rich theoretical literature and many efforts to measure these influences, a mature "social econometrics" has yet to emerge. This chapter provides a critical overview of the identification of social interactions. We...

I study the estimation of finite sequential games with perfect information. The major challenge in estimation is computation of high-dimensional truncated integration whose domain is complicated by strategic interaction. I show that this complication resolves when unobserved...

This paper studies the identification of players' preferences and beliefs in empirical applications of discrete choice games using experimental data. The experiment comprises a set of games with similar features (e.g., two-player coordination games) where each game has different values for the...

The empirical analysis of discrete complete-information games has relied on behavioral restrictions in the form of solution concepts, such as Nash equilibrium. Choosing the right solution concept is crucial not just for identification of payoff parameters, but also for the validity and...

We study nonparametric identification of single-agent discrete choice models for bundles (without requiring bundle-specific prices) and of binary games of complete information. We show that these two models are quite similar from an identification standpoint. Moreover, they are mathematically...

Sequential decision making among agents is a noticeable feature in strategic interactions in many subjects. The full estimation of sequential games, however, has been problematic due to the computational burden, especially when the game is large and asymmetric. In this paper, I propose an...