This paper analyzes pricing decisions and competition in network markets, assuming that groups of consumers can … differentiate. In Bertrand competition different firms might target high reservation value consumers on different sides of the … consumers. network choices. Enough heterogeneity in reservation values is necessary for existence of these asymmetric equilibria …

This paper assumes that groups of consumers in network markets can coordinate their choices when it is in their best … coexist in equilibrium if consumers have heterogeneous reservation values. A monopolist provider might choose to operate … multiple networks to price differentiate consumers on both sides of the market. Competing network providers might operate …

This paper analyzes pricing decisions and competition in network markets, assuming that groups of consumers can … differentiate. In Bertrand competition different firms might target high reservation value consumers on different sides of the … consumers' network choices. Enough heterogeneity in reservation values is necessary for existence of these asymmetric equilibria …

This paper assumes that groups of consumers in network markets can coordinate their choices when it is in their best … coexist in equilibrium if consumers have heterogeneous reservation values. A monopolist provider might choose to operate … multiple networks to price differentiate consumers on both sides of the market. Competing network providers might operate …