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Endogenous managerial compensation contracts in experimental quantity-setting duopolies
Barreda Tarrazona, Iván J.; Georgantzís, Nikolaos; … - In: Economic modelling 54 (2016), pp. 205-217
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011642108
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Our product is unique : a note on a delegation game with differentiated products
Buchen, Clemens; Hartmann, Sven A.; Palermo, Alberto - 2021
substitutability than it really has. This is so either because managers are biased and perceive the good in this way, or because firms …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012595219
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Managerial incentives, innovation and product market competition
Zhang, Zhentang - 2002
assign a non-profit-maximization objective to their managers. Consequently, managers in a delegation game invest more in cost …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011436367
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Managerial incentives, innovation and product market competition
Zhang, Zhentang - 2002
assign a non-profit-maximization objective to their managers. Consequently, managers in a delegation game invest more in cost …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013436209
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Endogenous market structures in a mixed oligopoly with a public firm whose managerial contract is based on welfare and bargaining over the managerial contract of a private firm
Nakamura, Yasuhiko - In: Economia politica : journal of analytical and … 34 (2017) 2, pp. 189-209
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011809538
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Stackelberg equilibria in managerial delegation games
Berr, Fabian - In: European journal of operational research : EJOR 212 (2011) 2, pp. 251-262
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009010112
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Competitive CSR in a strategic managerial delegation game with a multiproduct corporation
Garcia, Arturo; Leal, Mariel; Lee, Sang-Ho - In: International review of economics : RISEC 68 (2021) 3, pp. 301-330
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014251824
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CEO bias and product substitutability in oligopoly games
Schroeder, Elizabeth; Tremblay, Carol Horton; Tremblay, … - In: Games 13 (2022) 2, pp. 1-23
profitable for owners to hire biased managers. Our work shows that a universal policy that effectively eliminates such biases …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013172500
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Strategic delegation in experimental markets
Huck, Steffen; Müller, Wieland; Norman, Hans-Theo - 2000
contracts which determine their managers' salaries. One contract simply gives managers incentives to maximize firm profits …, while the second contract gives an additional sales bonus. Although theory predicts the second contract to be chosen, it is … only rarely chosen in the experimental markets. This behavior is rational given that managers do not play according to the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009781566
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Bargaining over managerial contracts in delegation games : managerial power, contract disclosure and cartel behavior
Witteloostuijn, Arjen van; Jansen, Thijs; Lier, Arie van - In: Managerial and decision economics : MDE ; the … 28 (2007) 8, pp. 897-904
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003611781