A model of interaction between hardware vendors, Intel and AMD, and developers of Windows and Linux operating systems is suggested. Intel and AMD both maximize profits forming a traditional oligopoly, while Microsoft and the community of Linux developers form a mixed duopoly, in which only the...

This paper endogeneizes the level of market coverage in a vertically differentiated market where firms decide first their qualities and next their prices. We extend the few endogeneization results to a more realistic setup, with quality dependent unit production costs. We show that, depending on...

We consider a model of price competition in a duopoly with product differentiation and network effects. The value of a good for a consumer is the sum of a common and an idiosyncratic component. The first captures the vertical dimension of quality, the second captures horizontal differentiation....

I find that current US's and EU's Antitrust laws -- in particular their "moderate"' leniency programmes that only reduce or at best cancel sanctions for price-fixing firms that self-report -- may make collusion enforceable even in one-shot competitive interactions, like Bertrand oligopolies and...

Horizontal shifts in bid curves observed in wholesale electricity markets are consistent with Cournot competition. Quantity competition reduces the informational requirements associated with evaluating market performance because the markups of all producers then depend on the same inverse...

Forward sales is a credible commitment to aggressive spot market bidding, and it mitigates producers' market power in electricity markets. Still it can be profitable for a producer to make such a commitment if it results in a soft response from competitors in the spot market (strategies are...

Horizontal shifts in bid curves observed in wholesale electricity markets are consistent with Cournot competition. Quantity competition reduces the informational requirements associated with evaluating market performance because the markups of all producers then depend on the same inverse...

This paper proposes an n-firm homogeneous-good Bertrand model with private information about costs. The model allows for any non-negative correlation between the cost draws and for any demand elasticity but still yields a closed-form solution. The solution is simple, in pure strategies, and...

Before solving the capacity-pricing game for oligopoly, Boccard and Wauthy (2000) argue that, as under duopoly, at a mixed-strategy equilibrium of the pricing game the largest firm's payoff equals the Stackelberg follower profit. We point to a nontrivial mistake in their argument and see how...

In credence goods markets, experts have better information about the appropriate quality of treatment than their customers. Because experts provide both the diagnosis and the treatment, there is opportunity for fraud. We experimentally investigate how the intensity of price competition and the...