We investigate the possibility of using public firms to regulate polluting emissions in a Cournot oligopoly where production takes place at constant returns to scale and entails a negative environmental externality. We model the problem as a differential game and investigate (i) the Cournot-Nash...

This paper studies the transition from monopoly by a public firm to mixed duopoly, in which public firm and private firm have heterogeneous objective functions. With different constant marginal costs, my theoretical model shows that the market prices and outputs do not change after entry by the...

I study the endogenous choice of a price or quantity contract in a mixed duopoly with a socially concerned firm which maximizes a combination of profit and consumer welfare. Contrasting the literature, I find that equilibria where firms adopt price contracts and quantity contracts might coexist....

We investigate the possibility of using public firms to regulate polluting emissions in a Cournot oligopoly where production takes place at constant returns to scale and entails a negative environmental externality. We model the problem as a differential game and investigate (i) the Cournot-Nash...