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One-Way Compatibility, Two-Way Compatibility and Entry in Network Industries
Manenti, Fabio M. - 2011
specifications, full incompatibility and preemption are again observed at the equilibrium. With incompatibility, entry deterrence …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013124727
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Competition between Vertically Differentiated Platforms
Zennyo, Yusuke - 2019
This paper investigates the competition between vertically differentiated platforms in two-sided markets. We assume the presence of two competing platforms producing either higher- or lower-quality devices for consumers. Each platform decides the price of its hardware device for consumers and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012904109
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On Vertical Product Differentiation, Network Externalities and Compatibility Decisions : Existence of Incompatible Networks
Sarkar, Sumit - 2005
Market mechanism may or may not throw up compatibility in markets for systems where network effect arises due to complementarity of component parts of a system. We consider a game, where, in stage 1, the firms decide whether to standardise on a single technological platform or not and at the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014070892
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One-Way Compatibility, Two-Way Compatibility and Entry in Network Industries
Manenti, Fabio M.; Somma, Ernesto - 2008
and the possibility of side payments. With incompatibility, entry deterrence occurs for sufficiently strong network …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014029696
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Network effects, compatibility decisions, and horizontal product differentiation
Woeckener, Bernd - 1999
This paper analyzes decisions on (in)compatibility and product design of two competing hardware suppliers in the presence of network effects. We show that they either establish compatibility and differentiate their variants strongly or maintain incompatibility and locate their variants at the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010305070
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Network externalities and downstream collusion under asymmetric costs : a note
Lee, Jen Yao; Fan, Chen-Chia; Tsai, Chien-Shu - In: Games 14 (2023) 2, pp. 1-11
This paper considers the collusive stability of downstream competition in a vertical market with network externalities and cost asymmetry. A dynamic collusion game is constructed, and backward induction is employed to solve the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. We show that larger network...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014422321
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License or entry with vertical differentiation in duopoly
Hattori, Masahiko; Tanaka, Yasuhito - In: Economics and Business Letters : EBL 5 (2016) 1, pp. 17-29
sufficiently high, license without entry strategy is optimum; if the low quality good’s quality is low, both of entry without … license strategy and license without entry strategy are optimum; when cost functions are quadratic, if the high quality good …’s quality is high, license without entry strategy is optimum; if the high quality good’s quality is low, entry with license …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011573193
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The market for melons: Cournot competition with unobserval qualities
Argenton, Cédric - 2006
Two firms produce different qualities at possibly different, constant marginal costs. They compete in quantities on a market where buyers only observe the average quality supplied. The model is a generalization of the standard Cournot duopoly, which corresponds to the special case where the two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281170
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Producers bargaining over a quality standard
Argenton, Cédric - 2006
We study an asymmetric information model in which two firms are active on a market where buyers only observe the average quality supplied. Quantities and cost structures are exogenously given and firms compete in quality. Before choosing their qualities, they bargain over a perfectly enforcable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281207
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The market for melons : Cournot competition with unobserval qualities
Argenton, Cédric (contributor) - 2006 - Rev. version December 2005
Two firms produce different qualities at possibly different, constant marginal costs. They compete in quantities on a market where buyers only observe the average quality supplied. The model is a generalization of the standard Cournot duopoly, which corresponds to the special case where the two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003254850