We examine the use of subsidies to R&D in a mixed and a private duopoly market. We show that the socially optimal R&D subsidy is increasing in the degree of spillovers but it is lower in the private duopoly. The optimal R&D subsidy leads to an increase in total R&D and production, however, it...

We examine the use of subsidies to R&D in a mixed and a private duopoly market. We show that the socially optimal R&D subsidy is increasing in the degree of spillovers but it is lower in the private duopoly. The optimal R&D subsidy leads to an increase in total R&D and production, however, it...

We investigate the possibility of using public firms to regulate polluting emissions in a Cournot oligopoly where production takes place at constant returns to scale and entails a negative environmental externality. We model the problem as a differential game and investigate (i) the Cournot-Nash...

Existing literature on mixed oligopoly focuses on competition among different types of firms but ignores their possible cooperation. We allow cooperation between public firm and private firm through subcontracting in a Hotelling mixed duopoly model. We find that when subcontracting is possible,...

We compare the welfare results of mixed duopoly model where a firm can be private, public or partial-delegated-public. We consider two types of partial-delegated-public firms. In partial- delegated-public with location delegation, the firm chooses location to maximize its profit while the social...

This paper studies the transition from monopoly by a public firm to mixed duopoly, in which public firm and private firm have heterogeneous objective functions. With different constant marginal costs, my theoretical model shows that the market prices and outputs do not change after entry by the...

By introducing the excess burden of taxation, we analyze endogenous choice of organizational form between U-form and M-form in the multiproduct mixed duopoly. With managerial delegation in public and private firms, we find that choosing M-form (U-form) for the public and private firms is a...

We analyze a mixed duopoly where the government runs the public firm partly with the objective of maximizing the profits of the private firm. The incumbent does so to secure funding for its political party. We find that it results in lower (higher) overall output goods are substitutes...

We analyze endogenous choice of organizational forms between U-form and M-form in the multiproduct mixed duopoly. With managerial delegation in public and private firms, we find that choosing M-form for the public and private firms is a dominant strategy under mixed duopoly in either Bertrand or...