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A well established belief both in the game-theoretic IO and in policy debates is that market concentration facilitates collusion. We show that this piece of conventional wisdom relies upon the assumption of profit-seeking behaviour, for it may be reversed when firms pursue other plausible goals....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011730010
In asymmetric dilemma games without side payments, players face involved cooperation and bargaining problems. The maximization of joint profits is implausible, players disagree on the collusive action, and the outcome is often inefficient. For the example of a Cournot duopoly with asymmetric...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011929323
In asymmetric dilemma games without side payments, players face involved cooperation and bargaining problems. The maximization of joint profits is implausible, players disagree on the collusive action, and the outcome is often inefficient. For the example of a Cournot duopoly with asymmetric...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011802796
In this paper, we tackle the dilemma of pruning versus proliferation in a vertically differentiated oligopoly under the assumption that some firms collude and control both the range of variants for sale and their corresponding prices, likewise a multiproduct firm. We analyse whether pruning...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011451580
proliferating their products. It is shown that a selective pruning within the cartel always occurs. Moreover, by associating a … cooperative (or coalitional) stability of the whole industry cartel is the equidistance of firms' products along the quality …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012954129
. Within this setting, we study four types of price-fixing agreement: (i) a segment-wide cartel in the premium submarket only …, (ii) a segment-wide cartel in the standard submarket only, (iii) two segment-wide cartels, and (iv) an industrywide cartel …-wide cartel prefers to maintain market shares at pre-collusive levels. The impact on consumer and social welfare critically …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012306748
proliferating their products. It is shown that a selective pruning within the cartel always occurs. Moreover, by associating a … cooperative (or coalitional) stability of the whole industry cartel is the equidistance of firms’ products along the quality …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011660599
In this paper, we tackle the dilemma of pruning versus proliferation in a vertically differentiated oligopoly under the assumption that some firms collude and control both the range of variants for sale and their corresponding prices, likewise a multiproduct firm. We analyse whether pruning...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012997248
This note extends the characterization of simultaneous investment (tacit collusion) equilibria in Boyer, Lasserre and Moreaux (2012). Tacit collusion equilibria may or may not exist, and when they do may involve either finite time investments (type 1) or infinite delay (type 2). The relationship...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014211034
Results are reported of a laboratory experiment aimed at examining whether strategic substitutability and strategic complementarity have an impact on the tendency to cooperate in two-player dominance-solvable games with a Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibrium. We find that there is significantly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014056834