I study the endogenous choice of a price or quantity contract in a mixed duopoly with a socially concerned firm which maximizes a combination of profit and consumer welfare. Contrasting the literature, I find that equilibria where firms adopt price contracts and quantity contracts might coexist....

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of privatization in a mixed duopoly, where a private firm complete in quantities with a welfare-maximizing public firm. We consider two inefficiencies of the public sector : a possible cost inefficiency and an allocative inefficiency due to...

We examine the use of subsidies to R&D in a mixed and a private duopoly market. We show that the socially optimal R&D subsidy is increasing in the degree of spillovers but it is lower in the private duopoly. The optimal R&D subsidy leads to an increase in total R&D and production, however, it...

We investigate the possibility of using public firms to regulate polluting emissions in a Cournot oligopoly where production takes place at constant returns to scale and entails a negative environmental externality. We model the problem as a differential game and investigate (i) the Cournot-Nash...

We examine the use of subsidies to R&D in a mixed and a private duopoly market. We show that the socially optimal R&D subsidy is increasing in the degree of spillovers but it is lower in the private duopoly. The optimal R&D subsidy leads to an increase in total R&D and production, however, it...

Existing literature on mixed oligopoly focuses on competition among different types of firms but ignores their possible cooperation. We allow cooperation between public firm and private firm through subcontracting in a Hotelling mixed duopoly model. We find that when subcontracting is possible,...

We compare the welfare results of mixed duopoly model where a firm can be private, public or partial-delegated-public. We consider two types of partial-delegated-public firms. In partial- delegated-public with location delegation, the firm chooses location to maximize its profit while the social...

This paper studies the transition from monopoly by a public firm to mixed duopoly, in which public firm and private firm have heterogeneous objective functions. With different constant marginal costs, my theoretical model shows that the market prices and outputs do not change after entry by the...

By introducing the excess burden of taxation, we analyze endogenous choice of organizational form between U-form and M-form in the multiproduct mixed duopoly. With managerial delegation in public and private firms, we find that choosing M-form (U-form) for the public and private firms is a...