This paper analyzes the situation in which a national government introduces environmental regulations. Within the framework of an international duopoly with environmental regulations, this paper shows that an environmental tax imposed by the government in the home country can induce a foreign...

This paper analyzes the situation in which a national government introduces environmental regulations. Within the framework of an international duopoly with environmental regulations, this paper shows that an environmental tax imposed by the government in the home country can induce a foreign...

This paper analyzes the situation in which a national government introduces environmental regulations. Within the framework of an international duopoly with environmental regulations, this paper shows that an environmental tax imposed by the government in the home country can induce a foreign...

We analyze a dynamic Bertrand game model of trade between Foreign and Home in which the Foreign firm's export good is shipped to Home in containers carried by ships. This shipment to Home may also result in the unwitting introduction of alien species from Foreign into Home. By undertaking...

We analyze a dynamic Bertrand game model of trade between Foreign and Home in which the Foreign firm's export good is shipped to Home in containers carried by ships. This shipment to Home may also result in the unwitting introduction of alien species from Foreign into Home. By undertaking...

The answer to the question in the title is yes for the case of ad-valorem taxes, a foreign industry that produces a vertically differentiated good of higher quality, and costs that take the form of qualitydependent fixed costs for both the foreign and domestic firm. The domestic industry loses...

Quotas act as facilitating practices under price competition. Because they relax price competition, they may affect firms' quality choice in very specific ways. We analyze this issue by considering the following stage game: a domestic government chooses an import quota, then a domestic and a...

We present a model of vertical product differentiation and exit where a domestic and a foreign firm face fixed setup costs and quality-dependent costs of production and compete in quality and price in the domestic market. Quality-dependent costs are quadratic in qualities, but independent of the...