The instability of Cournot cartels can be overcome by a collective wage agreement if this agreement stipulates minimum fixed wages and piece rates that are legally enforceable. This new view on the institution of collective wage agreements is not only relevant for strategic management, it also...

In contexts in which players have no priors, we analyze a learning process based on ex-post regret as a guide to understand how to play games of incomplete information under private values. The conclusions depend on whether players interact within a fixed set (fixed matching) or they are...

In contexts in which players have no priors, we analyze a learning process based on ex-post regret as a guide to understand how to play games of incomplete information under private values. The conclusions depend on whether players interact within a fixed set (fixed matching) or they are...

This note considers a bargaining environment with two-sided asymmetric information and quasilinear preferences in which parties select bargaining mechanism after learning their valuations. I demonstrate that sometimes the buyer achieves a higher ex-ante payoff if the bargaining mechanism is...

In a framework with an upstream monopoly and a downstream duopoly, we analyze the impact of convex costs on the downstream level. In contrast to the case of constant marginal costs, vertical integration does not imply complete market foreclosure. While the non-integrated downstream firm receives...

We study continuous time Bertrand oligopolies in which a small number of firms producing similar goods compete with one another by setting prices. We first analyze a static version of this game in order to better understand the strategies played in the dynamic setting. Within the static game, we...

We investigate asymmetric price transmission (APT) in laboratory experiments and find that imperfect tacit collusion is likely the cause in our otherwise frictionless markets. We vary the number of sellers across markets to evaluate the role competition plays in APT. We report similar magnitudes...

We study a discrete time dynamic game of price competition with spatially differentiated products and price adjustment costs. We characterise the Markov perfect and the open-loop equilibrium of our game. We find that in the steady state Markov perfect equilibrium, given the presence of...

It is widely believed that cartels with too many members are destined to fail. The standard argument is that as the number of cartel members increases, shares of collusive profit diminish relative to deviation profits. We show that this argument is built on unreasonable assumptions about plant...

This paper has investigated the asymmetric policies of information sharing in duopoly. We built on the classic model of Gal-Or (1985), extended to allow different precisions of firms' private information, as Gal-Or (1985) suggested in her conclusion. We find that asymmetric equilibria will...