We analyze differentiated retail industries where shops engage in two-stage competition with respect to opening hours and prices. We explore the effects of consumers' shopping time flexibility by comparing bi-directional consumers with forward- or backward-oriented consumers, who can either...

When firms set prices and face entry costs, efficiency in production and in entry are not simultaneously achieved, generating the possibility that regulatory interventions can lead to efficiency enhancements. We show through the Bertrand model that in markets with public entry and regular...

We examine incentives of bottleneck facility holders to manipulate access charge accounting in free entry downstream markets. We consider the situation wherein one firm holds an upstream bottleneck facility and new entrants use it at the regulated price (access fee) to provide final products....

Shaked and Sutton (1982) and Gelman and Salop (1983) are best remembered for their neat conclusions: a limited quality or limited capacity is an effective tool to relax competition and facilitate entry in a market. We aim at comparing the respective merits of these two strategic commitments. We...

Using a duopoly model with symmetric retailers, we show that retailer strategies regarding opening hours and quality choices of goods vary depending on the cost structure of the quality investment in goods. In the case of the cost remaining constant regardless of the length of opening hours, a...

We show in a simple model of entry with sunk cost, that a regulator prefers limiting the output, or capacity, of the incumbent firm rather than imposing a "Minimum Quality Standard" in order to help the entrant to provide high quality. As a by-product, our analysis makes a contribution to the...

Increasingly popular tailored regulation (TR) initiatives like EPA's Project XL allow plants to voluntarily substitute site-specific environmental performance standards for command-and-control regulations that dictate pollution abatement strategies. TR can significantly reduce participants'...

We extend the analysis carried out by Valletti (2000) by considering an environmental externality in a vertically differentiated duopoly where firms compete à la Cournot with fixed costs of quality improvement.We show that, if the weight of the external effect is high enough, the resulting...

We examine incentives of bottleneck facility holders to manipulate access charge accounting in free entry downstream markets. We consider the situation wherein one firm holds an upstream bottleneck facility and new entrants use it at the regulated price (access fee) to provide final products....