This paper analyzes the incentive for a cartel agreement between hospitals. For this purpose we extend a quality competition model developed by Montefiori (2005). We investigate that collusion on a low provided quality level will lead to higher profits for both hospitals. Therefore both...

In this paper, we study the rational for an incumbent to launch a second brand when facing potential entry in a market with quality differentiated products and a fringe producer. Depending on market size, costs for a second brand and a potential entrant’s setup cost the incumbent might use a...

In this paper, we analyze a vertically differentiated mixed duopoly in medical care services. Pollution is the source of illness. The government has a dual role. It decides how much to invest to reduce the pollution level and it may participate in the health market running a public hospital. We...

Hospital markets are often characterised by price regulation and the existence of different ownership types. Using a Hotelling framework, this paper analyses the effect of different objectives of the hospitals on quality, profits, and overall welfare in a price regulated duopoly with symmetric...

Hospital markets are often characterised by price regulation and the existence of different ownership types. Using a Hotelling framework, this paper analyses the effect of heterogeneous objectives of the hospitals on quality differentiation, profits, and overall welfare in a price regulated...

We study the equilibrium and its stability property in a duopoly market in which minimum quality standards (MQS) are set, prices are regulated with links to product quality, and firms compete in quality. The adjustment dynamics are taken into account. We focus on the role that MQS play, in...

Hospital markets are often characterised by price regulation and the existence of different ownership types. Using a Hotelling framework, this paper analyses the effect of different objectives of the hospitals on quality, profits, and overall welfare in a price regulated duopoly with symmetric...

This paper applies the framework of endogenous timing in games to mixed quantity duopoly, wherein a private – domestic or foreign – firm competes with a public, welfare maximizing firm. We show that simultaneous play never emerges as a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the extended game, in...

We discuss optimal privatization policies in mixed oligopolies in which a public firm is the Stackelberg follower (private leadership). We find that under constant marginal cost, the optimal degree of privatization is zero. When the marginal cost is increasing, however, the optimal degree is...

This study investigates mixed markets in which a social welfare-maximizing public firm and a private firm engage in behavior-based price discrimination (BBPD). Total of two cases are considered: one where domestic shareholders completely own the private firm and one where foreign shareholders...