We ran a large randomized controlled experiment among about 150,000 recipients of unemployment benefits insurance in France in order to evaluate the impact of part-time unemployment benefits. We took advantage of the lack of knowledge of job seekers regarding this program and sent emails...

We provide causal evidence of an ex ante moral hazard effect of Unemployment Insurance (UI) by matching plausibly exogenous changes in UI benefit duration across state-weeks during the Great Recession to high-frequency productivity measures from individual supermarket cashiers. Estimating models...

Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante...

Many studies have found that the exit rate from unemployment increases in the vicinity of the exhaustion day of unemployment insurance benefits. The extent to which this "spike" is driven by job search behavior is important for assessing the distortionary effect of unemployment insurance. Card,...

This paper examines the effects of unemployment benefit duration in Finland. To overcome the problem that the maximum duration of benefits is the same for all unemployed we exploit two observations. First, despite the uniform maximum benefit period, potential benefit duration at the beginning of...

This paper analyzes the effects of unemployment insurance (UI) benefits on unemployment exits and subsequent labor market outcomes. We exploit a piecewise linear relationship between the previous wage and UI benefits in Finland to identify the causal effects of the benefit level by using a...