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Strategies and interactive beliefs in dynamic games

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Feedback spillover and analogy-based expectations : a multi-game experiment

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Dynamic processes of social and economic interactions : on the persistence of inefficiencies

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Dynamic processes of social and economic interactions : on the persistence of inefficiencies

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Dynamic Processes of Social and Economic Interactions : On the Persistence of Inefficiencies

Gomes, Armando R.; Jehiel, Philippe - 2014

An economy with a finite number of agents and a finite number of states is considered. An exogenous institutional rule prescribes what moves from one state to another are feasible to each coalition. At each time an agent is called to act with some exogenous probability, and he chooses a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014126893