The paper examines a game-theoretic evolutionary model of a …-nancial market with endogenous equilibrium asset prices. Assetspay dividends that are partially consumed and partially rein-vested. The traders use general, adaptive strategies (portfoliorules), distributing their wealth between...

The paper examines a game-theoretic evolutionary model of anasset market with endogenous equilibrium asset prices. Assetspay dividends that are partially consumed and partially rein-vested. The investors use general, adaptive strategies (portfo-lio rules), distributing their wealth between...

The paper examines a game-theoretic model of a financial market in which asset prices are determined endogenously in terms of a short-run equilibrium. Investors use general, adaptive strategies (portfolio rules) depending on the exogenous states of the world and the observed history of the game....

We formally define Markov quantal response equilibrium (QRE) and prove existence for all finite discounted dynamic stochastic games. The special case of logit Markov QRE constitutes a mapping from precision parameter λ to sets of logit Markov QRE. The limiting points of this correspondence...

We formally define Markov quantal response equilibrium (QRE) and prove existence for all finite discounted dynamic stochastic games. The special case of logit Markov QRE constitutes a mapping from precision parameter ... to sets of logit Markov QRE. The limiting points of this correspondence are...

This paper studies generic properties of Markov perfect equilibria in dynamic stochastic games. We show that almost all dynamic stochastic games have a finite number of locally isolated Markov perfect equilibria. These equilibria are essential and strongly stable. Moreover, they all admit...

Discrete-time stochastic games with a finite number of states have been widely applied to study the strategic interactions among forward-looking players in dynamic environments. These games suffer from a “curse of dimensionality” when the cost of computing players’ expectations over all...

This paper develops a theory of regular Markov perfect equilibria in dynamic stochastic games. We show that almost all dynamic stochastic games have a finite number of locally isolated Markov perfect equilibria that are all regular. These equilibria are essential and strongly stable. Moreover,...