This paper uses lattice programming methods along with the extension of Tarski's fixed point theorem due to Veinott (1992) and Zhou (1994) to establish sufficient conditions for existence of sequential symmetric Markov equilibrium in a large class of dynamic games. Our method is constructive and...

We study investment and consumption decisions in a dynamic game under learning. To that end, we present a model in which agents not only extract a resource for consumption, but also invest in technology to improve the future stock. At the same time, the agents learn about the stochastic process...

We study investment and consumption decisions in a dynamic game under learning. To that end, we present a model in which agents not only extract a resource for consumption, but also invest in technology to improve the future stock. At the same time, the agents learn about the stochastic process...

We analyze imperfect competition in dynamic environments where firms use rivalrous but non-excludable industry-specific capital that is provided exogenously. Capital depreciation depends on utilization, so firms influence the evolution of the capital equipment through more or less intensive...