Static and dynamic games are important tools for the analysis of strategic interactions among economic agents and have found many applications in economics. In many games, equilibria can be described as solutions of polynomial equations. In this paper, we describe state-of-the-art techniques for...

Discrete-time stochastic games with a finite number of states have been widely applied to study the strategic interactions among forward-looking players in dynamic environments. These games suffer from a “curse of dimensionality” when the cost of computing players’ expectations over all...

Static and dynamic games are important tools for the analysis of strategic interactions among economic agents and have found many applications in economics. In many games equilibria can be described as solutions of polynomial equations. In this paper we describe state-of-the-art techniques for...

Continuous-time stochastic games with a finite number of states have substantial computational and conceptual advantages over the more common discrete-time model. In particular, continuous time avoids a curse of dimensionality and speeds up computations by orders of magnitude in games with more...