Static and dynamic games are important tools for the analysis of strategic interactions among economic agents and have found many applications in economics. In many games equilibria can be described as solutions of polynomial equations. In this paper we describe state-of-the-art techniques for...

Static and dynamic games are important tools for the analysis of strategic interactions among economic agents and have found many applications in economics. In many games, equilibria can be described as solutions of polynomial equations. In this paper, we describe state-of-the-art techniques for...

In this paper we look at a new way to combine both quantity precommitment and price competition in a dynamic games framework. In each period players choose to invest in production capacities for the next period and also engage in a price competition. Production is free up to capacity and has...

Continuous-time stochastic games with a finite number of states have substantial computational and conceptual advantages over the more common discrete-time model. In particular, continuous time avoids a curse of dimensionality and speeds up computations by orders of magnitude in games with more...

Continuous-time stochastic games with a finite number of states have substantial computational and conceptual advantages over the more common discrete-time model. In particular, continuous time avoids a curse of dimensionality and speeds up computations by orders of magnitude in games with more...