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A theory of deception

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Calibrated clustering and analogy-based expectation equilibrium

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Dynamic processes of social and economic interactions : on the persistence of inefficiencies

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Dynamic Processes of Social and Economic Interactions : On the Persistence of Inefficiencies

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An economy with a finite number of agents and a finite number of states is considered. An exogenous institutional rule prescribes which moves from one state to another are feasible to each coalition. At each time, an agent is called to act with some exogenous probability, and he chooses a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014065026

Dynamic Processes of Social and Economic Interactions : On the Persistence of Inefficiencies

Gomes, Armando R.; Jehiel, Philippe - 2014

An economy with a finite number of agents and a finite number of states is considered. An exogenous institutional rule prescribes what moves from one state to another are feasible to each coalition. At each time an agent is called to act with some exogenous probability, and he chooses a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014126893