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We propose a structural econometric evaluation for auctions with discrete increments. Although very common in practice, this kind of mechanism raises many theoretical difficulties. First, there are no closed form equilibriumstrategies. Thus the econometrician cannot rely on a single formula to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005478908
In this paper, we study maximum likelihood estimation and Lagrange multiplier testing of a one-way error components regression model suitable for incomplete panel and including parametrically specified variance functions for both individual-specific and general error disturbances.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005478910
In this note we discuss two examples of approval voting games.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005478948
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005478971
Voting games are characterized by the emergence of dominated strategies, that would be iteratively deleted by rational players. In this note we show, via an example, how applying iterated dominance retricts the set of equilibrium outcomes in Besley and Coate (1997) citizen-candidate model of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005478972
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005478973
We first analyse the general problem of admissible conditioning and next consider the evaluation of the loss of information when a non-admissible conditioning is used as an approximation of the exact posterior distribution. Considering the case of Fisher test, we evaluate from a Bayesian point...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005478975
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005669228
The notion of disapprobation is defined. It is designed to capture some features of misspecification in a decision-theoretic framework. Moreover, it is a sample-based notion so it is well-suited for the study of misspecification in Bayesian contexts. Some elementary examples of disapprobation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005669262
In this paper we prove that for generic (non cooperative) voting games under plurality rule an equilibrium that induces a mixed distribution over the outcomes (i.e. with two or more candidates elected with positive probability) is isolated. From that we deduce also that the set of equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005669273