We extend Kohlberg and Mertens' (1986) structure theorem concerning the Nash equilibrium correspondence to show that its graph is not only homomorphic to the underlying space of games but that it is also unknotted. This is then shown to have some basic consequences for dynamics whose rest points...

If the allocations of a differential information economy are defined as incentive compatible state -contingent lotteries over consumption goods, competitive equilibrium allocations exist and belong to the (ex-ante incentive) core. Furthermore, any competitive equilibria allocation can be viewed...

The paper takes the search and matching model of the aggregate labor market to the data. It tests the model's empirical validity and employs structural estimation to generate a characterization of the optimal behavior of firms and workers. The model is applied to Israeli data that are uniquely...

We study environments where a production process is jointly shared by a finite group of agents. The social decision involves the determination of input contribution and output distribution. We define a competitive solution when there is decreasing returns-to-scale and show that it leads to a...

In an economy with asymmetric information, Rational Expectations Equilibria (REE) need not become asymptotically incentive compatible, even if many independent replicas of the economy are merged together. We identify a sub-class of REE for which this is nevertheless the case.