We show in a differential game of a differentiated product doupoly model of price competition with costly production adjustment that when firms are symmetric the leadership attempt by each firm turns into Stackelberg price warfare yielding a (MArkov perfect) steady state outcome more competitive...

The core of an economy consists of those states of the economy which no group of agents (coalition) can "improve upon". A coalition can improve upon a state of the economy if, by using the means available to that group, each member can be made better off. This paper presents the notion of the...

This paper studies convergence and stability properties of Sjostrom's (1994) mechanism, under the assumption that boundedly rational players find their way to equilbrium using monotonic learning dynamics and best-reply dynamics. This mechanism implements most social choice functions in economic...

Some of the most interesting results in the modern theory of fiscal federalism indicate that, contrary to expectations, even if there are interstate externalities, socially optimal policy choices are a non cooperative equilibrium of a game played by sovereign states. These results are shown to...

In this paper, we develop an economic growth model taking into account two factors of production: fixed capital and labor force, to study the dynamics of GDP growth. The dependence of the output of these factors is described by a production function of the exponential type. Within the framework...

Капитализм второй половины ХХ в. показал удивительную живучесть после избавления от Великой депрессии. Вера в безграничные возможности эффективных финансовых...

This paper solves the equilibrium problem in a pure-exchange, continuous-time economy in which some agents face information costs or other types of frictions effectively preventing them from investing in the stock market. Under the assumption that the restricted agents have logarithmic...