The core of an economy consists of those states of the economy which no group of agents (coalition) can "improve upon". A coalition can improve upon a state of the economy if, by using the means available to that group, each member can be made better off. This paper presents the notion of the...

This paper studies convergence and stability properties of Sjostrom's (1994) mechanism, under the assumption that boundedly rational players find their way to equilbrium using monotonic learning dynamics and best-reply dynamics. This mechanism implements most social choice functions in economic...

Some of the most interesting results in the modern theory of fiscal federalism indicate that, contrary to expectations, even if there are interstate externalities, socially optimal policy choices are a non cooperative equilibrium of a game played by sovereign states. These results are shown to...

We show in a differential game of a differentiated product doupoly model of price competition with costly production adjustment that when firms are symmetric the leadership attempt by each firm turns into Stackelberg price warfare yielding a (MArkov perfect) steady state outcome more competitive...

A general equilibrium framework is developed for analyzing the role of immobile factors of production which produce inputs for other sectors.

The essential idea of equilibrium search models of labor market behavior is that wage policy matters. In this paper we provide for estimating equilibrium search models using a non-parametric estimator of heterogeneity.