In this paper, we focus on the trade and quote data for the IBM stock traded at the NYSE. We present two different framworks for analyzing this dataset. First, using regularly sampled observations, we characterize the intraday volatility of the mid-point of the bid-ask quotes by estimating GARCH...

This paper proposes a new kind of asymmetric GARCh where the conditional variance obeys two different regimes with a smooth transition function. In one formulation, the conditional variance reacts differently to negative and positive shocks while in a second formulation, small and big shocks...

based on Chari and Jagannathan (1988), this paper models information-induced and "pure-panic"runs in an environment of risk-aves agents. In this framework, deposits are needed to provide insurance against investors'unexpected demand for liquidity and therefore, a role for financial intermediary...

In this paper we prove that for generic (non cooperative) voting games under plurality rule an equilibrium that induces a mixed distribution over the outcomes (i.e. with two or more candidates elected with positive probability) is isolated. From that we deduce also that the set of equilibrium...

We model the decision problems faced by the members of societies whose new members are determined by vote. We adopt a number of simplifying assumptions. In spite of these simplifications, we show that interesting strategic behavior is implied by the dynamic structure of the problem: the vote for...

We analyze the problem of competitive mechanism design within the context of a model of product differentiated oligopoly. In an oligopoly setting, participation by an agent in any one firm's catalog is endogenously determined. This facts leads naturally to a modification of the classical notion...

Within this framework of pure redistriubtion (dividing one unit of a homogeneous good among identical individuals), the paper analyses the redistributions that arise from Downsian two-party electoral competition. It appears that the strategic behavior of vote-maximizing parties lead them to...

In a model where agents have unequal production skills and different preferences, we build social welfare functions which rely only on ordinal non-comparable information on individual preferences. Social welfare functions are required to satisfy properties of compensation for inequalities in...

This paper studies the impact of considering the incentives of candidates to strategically affect the outcome of a voting procedure. First we show that every non-dictatorial voting procedure that satisfies unanimity, is open to strategic entry or exit by candidates: there necessarily exists some...

In this paper we analyze a model of proportional representation that allows for both sincere and strategic voting. We prove that strategic voters vote only for the extreme parties in any equilibrium,if the electorate is large.