This paper defines a decomposition of technical efficiency for a series of nonparametric deterministic reference technologies related to the Free Disposal Hull. More specificaally, introducing several returns to scale assumptions into this non-convex production model allows one to distinguish...

In this note we discuss two examples of approval voting games.

Voting games are characterized by the emergence of dominated strategies, that would be iteratively deleted by rational players. In this note we show, via an example, how applying iterated dominance retricts the set of equilibrium outcomes in Besley and Coate (1997) citizen-candidate model of...

Williamson (1979) claims that in a buyer-seller relationship with observable but unverifiable investments and state of nature, the hold up of future benefits leads to underinvestment. Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (1994) resolve it provided that the initial contract can specify a default option...

This paper proposes a new kind of asymmetric GARCh where the conditional variance obeys two different regimes with a smooth transition function. In one formulation, the conditional variance reacts differently to negative and positive shocks while in a second formulation, small and big shocks...

based on Chari and Jagannathan (1988), this paper models information-induced and "pure-panic"runs in an environment of risk-aves agents. In this framework, deposits are needed to provide insurance against investors'unexpected demand for liquidity and therefore, a role for financial intermediary...

In this paper we prove that for generic (non cooperative) voting games under plurality rule an equilibrium that induces a mixed distribution over the outcomes (i.e. with two or more candidates elected with positive probability) is isolated. From that we deduce also that the set of equilibrium...

We model the decision problems faced by the members of societies whose new members are determined by vote. We adopt a number of simplifying assumptions. In spite of these simplifications, we show that interesting strategic behavior is implied by the dynamic structure of the problem: the vote for...

We analyze the problem of competitive mechanism design within the context of a model of product differentiated oligopoly. In an oligopoly setting, participation by an agent in any one firm's catalog is endogenously determined. This facts leads naturally to a modification of the classical notion...

Within this framework of pure redistriubtion (dividing one unit of a homogeneous good among identical individuals), the paper analyses the redistributions that arise from Downsian two-party electoral competition. It appears that the strategic behavior of vote-maximizing parties lead them to...