Two ownership systems are compared: one where outsiders own the physical assets of firms and another where these assets are jointly owned by workers. Effort and side payments are self-enforced. Market-wide incentive constraints lead to restrictions on the distribution of profit between capital...

Two ownership systems are compared: one where outsiders own the physical assets of firms and another where these assets are jointly owned by workers. Effort and side payments are self-enforced. Market-wide incentive constraints lead to restrictions on the distribution of profit between capital...

Анализируется состояние и основные проблемы перехода к инновационной экономике. Даны конкретные предложения, которые будут способствовать активизации...

Анализируется состояние и основные проблемы развития науки и перехода к инновационной экономике на примере предприятий подотрасли электровозостроения. Даны...

For twenty-five years, the US and Japanese goverments have seen the rise of corporate groups in Japan, Keiretsu, as due in part to foreign pressure to liberalize the Japanese market. In fact, virtually all of the recent works that discuss barriers in a historical context argue that Japanese...

In this paper we have developed a general model of borrowing constraints based on the idea of limited enforcement. I our model, borrowing constraints arise as part of the optimal borrowing and lending contract. Our model extends previous theories of borrowing and lending , such as Hart and Moore...