The aim of this article is to explore the most recent appeals concerning illegal cartels under Article 101 TFEU by revealing the relevant principles underpinning both the substantive and the procedural review of price-fixing agreements. Arguments advancing a perceived ‘criminalisation' of the...

Continued lobbying by high-end, American designers for intellectual property-type fashion design protection has culminated in the proposed Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act, intended to introduce EU standards. Using a sequential, 2-firm, vertical differentiation framework,...

The literature shows that horizontal shareholding engenders significant anticompetitive effects and that no suitable instrument exists within European competition law which reliably and effectively can be applied to curtail such intrinsic effects. This Article analyses several proposals which...

Both in the US and in Europe, antitrust authorities prohibit merger not only if the merged entity, in and of itself, is no longer sufficiently controlled by competition. The authorities also intervene if, post merger, the market structure has changed such that tacit collusion becomes...

The debate on the regulation of minority shareholdings as a type of “structural link” between competing undertakings is not a new one in the sphere of EU competition law. As a matter of policy, the incomplete and rather divisive treatment of minority shareholdings under the current EU merger...

Continued lobbying by high-end, American designers for intellectual property-type fashion design protection has culminated in the proposed Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act, intended to introduce EU standards. Using a sequential, 2-firm, vertical differentiation framework,...

In a Stackelberg oligopoly with cost asymmetry and possibility of entry, the Stackelberg leader faces a kinked demand curve. For a robust interval of cost of the leader, the equilibrium price is rigid with respect to small changes in demand and costs of active firms

Minority shareholdings have been on the regulatory agenda of competition authorities for some time. Recent empirical studies, however, draw attention to a new, thought provoking theory of harm: common ownership by institutional investors holding small, parallel equity positions in several...