of marriage-related tax-benefit instruments on the labour supply of married couples. For each married partner, we … estimate their individual marginal effective tax rate and net replacement rate before and after marriage. We show that the … marriage bonus, which is economically significant in eight European countries, decreases the work incentives for women and …

of marriage-related tax-benefit instruments on the labour supply of married couples. For each married partner, we … estimate their individual marginal effective tax rate and net replacement rate before and after marriage. We show that the … marriage bonus, which is economically significant in eight European countries, decreases the work incentives for women and …

. Motivated by these observations, we develop a life-cycle model with heterogeneous agents, marriage and divorce and use it to … study the impact of two mechanisms on labor supply: (i) differences in marriage stability and (ii) differences in tax … systems, and as we replace the U.S. divorce and marriage rates with their European equivalents. We find that the divorce and …

show substantial bonuses for married couples and four exhibit marriage penalties. On a micro level, we find that these … marriage bonuses/penalties differ substantially across household types and income. From a policy point of view, our results … suggest that the abolishment of marriage-related tax-benefit components in countries with marriage bonuses would leave some …

show substantial bonuses for married couples and four exhibit marriage penalties. On a micro level, we find that these … marriage bonuses/penalties differ substantially across household types and income. From a policy point of view, our results … suggest that the abolishment of marriage-related tax-benefit components in countries with marriage bonuses would leave some …