Many cartels are formed by individual managers of different firms, but not by firms as collectives. However, most of the literature in industrial economics neglects individuals' incentives to form cartels. Although oligopoly experiments reveal important insights on individuals acting as firms,...

Many cartels are formed by individual managers of different firms, but not by firms as collectives. However, most of the literature in industrial economics neglects individuals' incentives to form cartels. Although oligopoly experiments reveal important insights on individuals acting as firms,...

The literature shows that horizontal shareholding engenders significant anticompetitive effects and that no suitable instrument exists within European competition law which reliably and effectively can be applied to curtail such intrinsic effects. This Article analyses several proposals which...

The aim of this article is to explore the most recent appeals concerning illegal cartels under Article 101 TFEU by revealing the relevant principles underpinning both the substantive and the procedural review of price-fixing agreements. Arguments advancing a perceived ‘criminalisation' of the...

Digital platforms operate in multisided markets providing services through the internet to two or more distinct groups of users, between which there are indirect network effects. Direct network effects are frequently present within each group. Therefore, online platforms usually present both...

This paper deals with the application of the SIEC test in German merger control using the decision by the Bundeskartellamt (German Federal Cartel Office) in the Edeka/ Kaiser’s Tengelmann case (file no. B2-96/14) as an example. The focus is on two aspects which are of particular interest from...